We consider a principal-agent model of adverse selection where, in order to trade with the principal, the agent must undertake a relationship-speci…c investment which a¤ects his outside option to trade, i.e. the payo¤ that he can obtain by trading with an alternative principal. This creates a distinction between the agent's ex ante (before investment) and ex post (after investment) outside options to trade. We investigate the consequences of this distinction, and show that whenever an agent's ex ante and ex post outside options di¤er, this equips the principal with an additional tool for screening among di¤erent agent types, by randomizing over the probability with which trade occurs once the agent has undertaken the investment. In turn, this may enhance the e¢ciency of the optimal second-best contract.
Introduction
In many forms of bilateral exchange, one party often has to undertake relationship-speci…c investments before trade can occur with their partner. An important consequence of such speci…c investments is that they typically change the investing party's outside option to trade, namely the payo¤ that he would obtain by trading with an alternative partner. For example, a …rm that tailors its machinery in order to produce a speci…c widget required by a certain buyer, will change its production possibilities when trading with alternative buyers whose requirements need not be the same. 1 A key distinction therefore exists between the …rm's ex ante outside option, before the relationshipspeci…c investment is undertaken, and their ex post outside option, after the investment has occurred. This paper investigates the consequences of this distinction in principal-agent models of adverse selection, where the agent's type is his private information, and both parties are risk neutral. We show that whenever an agent's ex ante and ex post outside options di¤er, this may equip the principal with an additional tool for screening among di¤erent agent types, by randomizing over the probability with which trade occurs once the agent has undertaken the speci…c investment. In turn, this may enhance the e¢ciency of the optimal second-best contracts.
This paper contributes to the literature on mechanism design when agents have type-dependent outside options (Lewis and Sappington 1989, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1995, Jullien 2000). The earlier literature on adverse selection identi…es several cases in which the optimal mechanism can involve randomization, such as when agents have di¤erent levels of risk aversion (Stiglitz 1982 . We add to this literature by considering situations where relationship-speci…c investments a¤ect the agent's future prospects, so that his type-dependent ex ante and ex post outside options di¤er. This provides a novel rationale of why randomization may be optimal in principal-agent settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the principal-agent model. Section 3 solves for the optimal second best contracts. Section 4 discusses the e¢ciency consequences of having both types of outside option. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Model
Preliminaries We consider a principal-agent model with a principal P and an agent A, who contract over the production of output, q. Production is assumed to be observable and veri…able. The 1 This phenomenon is not con…ned to bilateral exchange between …rms. Consider a traveller who wants to travel from A to B at 8pm on a given day. The traveller can choose whether to travel by train or bus. The speci…c investment undertaken by the traveller in order to access a certain type of travel takes the form of him being physically present at a particular location -the bus or train station -at a particular time. While from an ex ante perspective the traveller's outside option to catching the 8pm bus would be to take the 8pm train, once he has made the speci…c investment of arriving at the bus station prior to 8pm, his ex post outside option to catching the 8pm bus will be quite di¤erent. While he may for example catch the 9pm train, the 8pm train has been ruled infeasible by his earlier speci…c investment.
agent's marginal cost of production, µ, which de…nes his type, is not observed by the principal, and we assume µ 2 fµ H ,µ L g, where µ H > µ L > 0, and prob(µ = µ H ) =¸. In order to trade with the principal, the agent must undertake a relationship-speci…c investment, with cost normalized to zero. The agent's decision to undertake the investment is observable and veri…able. A contract between the principal and the agent is denoted fÁ; ¼; q; Tg, where Á 2 f0; 1g speci…es whether the agent must undertake the investment 2 , ¼ 2 [0; 1] denotes the probability with which trade occurs between the parties, q 2 [0; q] denotes the output that the agent must produce in case of trade, and T 2 R + indicates the payment from the principal to the agent (independent of whether trade actually occurs or not). We assume trade can only occur if the agent has made the relationship-speci…c investment so that if Á i = 0, ¼ i = 0. 3 The principal's problem consists of designing the optimal menu of contracts from which the agent makes his preferred choice. The revelation principle states this search can be con…ned to the set of direct revelation mechanisms, whereby the agent is requested to report his type and is o¤ered a contract that is contingent upon this report. The timing of actions is then as follows. t=0 P o¤ers A a menu of contracts M = fM H ; M L g, where M i = fÁ i ; ¼ i ; q i ; T i g is the contract o¤ered to the agent when his reported type is µ i , i = H; L. t=0.5 If A accepts M i and M i speci…es Á i = 1, A undertakes the relationship-speci…c investment. t=1 Conditional on Á i = 1, trade occurs with probability ¼ i , in which case A produces q i . With probability 1 ¡ ¼ i trade between A and P does not occur. If Á i = 0, trade between A and P does not occur with certainty. t=1.5 Provided that he has respected the terms of the contract, A receives T i .
Without loss of generality we restrict attention to contracts that always induce truthtelling and participation by the agent.
Agent's Ex ante and Ex post Outside Options If the agent does not accept the principal's contract, or if his contract prescribes Á = 0, then the agent does not undertake any relationship-speci…c investment, and obtains a payo¤ B i¸0 from alternative trade, where i = H; L. This de…nes the agent's ex ante outside option. Importantly, we allow for the possibility that ex ante outside options di¤er across types, so that B H 6 = B L . If the agent undertakes the relationship-speci…c investment, but trade between the parties does not occur, then the agent obtains a payo¤ C i < B i from alternative trade. C i captures the agent's ex post outside option, namely the value of him trading prospects with alternative principals, after having undertaken the relationship-speci…c investment with the previous principal. Ex post outside options may also be type-dependent, so that C H 6 = C L . The expression B i ¡ C i > 0 re ‡ects the loss in terms of the agent's alternative trading prospects from undertaking the relationship-speci…c investment, which tailors his production to the principal's needs. We refer to this as the opportunity cost of randomization, since this cost is only incurred when ¼ < 1.
Payo¤s Both parties are assumed to be risk neutral with respect to monetary transfers and production. If a type µ i agent accepts a contract fÁ; ¼; q; T g, his net expected utility is,
The principal's expected payo¤ is U P = ¼vq ¡ T , where v > µ H . u i denotes the utility obtained by a type µ i agent when he truthfully declares his type. From (1), the value of T is determined for any given values of u i , Á, ¼ and q. In what follows we will therefore characterize a contract as
Results
The participation constraint for a type µ i agent is
The incentive compatibility constraints which ensure agents …nd it optimal to declare their true type are,
Suppose full information contracts are o¤ered so that
Constraint IC H becomes, 0¸¡q¢µ ¡ ¢B, and IC L becomes, 0¸q¢µ + ¢B. We focus on the more intuitive case in which q¢µ +¢B > 0 so µ L types have incentives to overstate their costs and mimic µ H types. This is embodied in assumption A1 below. 4 To ensure that under full information the optimal contract prescribes Á i = ¼ i = 1, q i = q for both types, assumption A2 below is required. Assumptions A3 and A4 ensure that if ¼ H = 0 and/or q H = 0, the principal cannot gain from asking type µ H to undertake the relationship-speci…c investment. To summarize, the assumptions on the exogenous parameters are,
Our …rst result provides a partial characterization of type µ H 's optimal contract whenever µ H agents are required to undertake the relationship-speci…c investment.
Lemma 1: It is never optimal for the principal to o¤er Á H = 1 in conjunction with ¼ H and q H satisfying,
Under A1 the full information contracts would violate IC L . By o¤ering type µ H agents a contract such that ¼ H q H ¢µ ¡ (1 ¡ ¼ H )¢C + ¢B = 0, the principal ensures both that IC L is satis…ed and that no rents are o¤ered to µ L agents. O¤ering µ H agents a contract such that (2) holds would only increase the distortions of ¼ H and/or q H from their full information values (1 and q respectively) without generating any gain for the principal. This is essentially the rationale for Lemma 1. An implication of Lemma 1 is that the participation constraint of type µ L will not bind at the optimum because given type µ H 's participation, IC L implies u L > u H¸0 . In what follows, we therefore allow IC L to hold with equality, let u H = 0, and ignore constraint IC H . We then later verify that the solution of the relaxed problem indeed satis…es IC H . The principal's problem then is,
where (C1) derives from Lemma 1. We …rst solve (P) ignoring (C1). If this solution satis…es (C1), it is the solution to the overall problem. Otherwise (C1) binds. The principal faces a standard trade-o¤ between e¢ciency and informational rents. If she o¤ers µ H types the e¢cient (full-information) contract where Á H = ¼ H = 1, q H = q, then she must also o¤er positive rents to µ L types to prevent mimicking. In this case (C1) is slack. If the principal wishes to eliminate µ L 's rents, then she must distort type µ H 's contract away from the e¢cient contract. 5 In this case (C1) binds so, conditional on Á H = 1, we have,
As q H 2 [0; q], condition (3) may restrict the range of values of ¼ H the principal can o¤er. As a result, the optimal contract may prescribe randomization so ¼ H 2 (0; 1). Our main result fully describes the optimal second best contracts.
6
Proposition 1: For type µ L , the optimal contract always prescribes
then ( C1) is slack, and the optimal contract for type µ H has Á H = ¼ H = 1, q H = q. If (4) does not hold, then (C1) binds, and the optimal contract for type µ H is,
and ¢B < ¡ 5 Given the linearity of her payo¤, the principal would never select contracts between these extremes. 6 We adopt the convention that if P is indi¤erent between setting Á i = 1 or Á i = 0 for i = H; L, then she selects Á i = 0.
If prob(µ = µ H ) =¸is su¢ciently high, then the principal …nds it optimal to o¤er µ H types the e¢cient contract, so as to maximize her pro…t when trading with µ H types, even if this implies that positive rents are relinquished to agents of type µ L . Conversely, if¸is su¢ciently low, then the principal prefers to allow (C1) to bind and so eliminate any rents to µ L types.
Proposition 1 makes precise the optimal contract for µ H types will prescribe randomization if two
The intuition why these conditions lead the optimal second best contract to involve randomization is as follows.
Condition (a) requires that C H should not be too low. If C H is low, then the transfer needed by µ H types to accept a contract that involves randomization is high and the principal prefers to set ¼ H = 1 even if this implies a lower prescribed q H .
Condition (b) requires the opportunity cost of randomization to be higher for µ L types than for µ H . Hence, by o¤ering µ H types a contract involving randomization, the principal can lower the incentives of µ L types to overstate their costs and mimic µ H types. In contrast, if ¢C ¡ ¢B · 0, then µ H types stand to lose more from randomization than µ L types, and so randomization would not help deter µ H from mimicking µ L . Condition (b) also requires ¢C ¡ ¢B to be su¢ciently large, which ensures the principal can obtain a positive expected pro…t when trading with type µ L . (4) :25 ¡ 1:75 i ¡ 0:1. This is decreasing in ¼ H -a lower ¼ H decreases the probability of trade, but it also increases q H , and hence the value of trade. In this numerical example, the latter e¤ect is stronger than the former, so the principal selects the lowest ¼ H compatible with (C1). The optimal contract for µ H then is, Á H = 1; ¼ H = 0:375; q H = q = 2, and when dealing with type µ H agents, the principal's expected payo¤ is 0:18.
A Numerical Example

Discussion
E¢ciency Proposition 1 highlights the impact of having two type-dependent outside options on the optimal second best contracts. Suppose that, on the contrary, C i = B i for both i = H; L, so ¢C = ¢B. From (3), the only for (C1) to then bind is to set q H = ¡ Hence, in a complete contracting environment, the need for agents to undertake relationship-speci…c investments ex ante that decrease the agent's outside option, can result in greater ex post e¢ciency, that is, at the production stage. This is because such investments enable the principal to utilize randomization as a tool to screen between agent types. To our knowledge, the earlier literature has not noted this potentially useful role for ex ante relationship-speci…c investments to improve on ex post e¢ciency. The literature has emphasized rather, that in the presence of contractual incompleteness, investment speci…city results in ex ante ine¢ciencies, i.e. ine¢ciencies at the investment stage (Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990).
Relaxing the Linearity Assumption The restriction to linear payo¤ functions allows us to abstract from risk-aversion considerations, and to di¤erentiate our results from the existing literature on randomization in mechanism design (Stiglitz 1982 , Arnott and Stiglitz 1988, Brito et al 1995). However, our results extend also to non-linear settings. To see one particular example of this, suppose agents have quadratic production costs, so the net utility of an type µ i agent when accepting a contract fÁ; ¼; q; Tg is,
The full-information contracts prescribe
+ ¢B > 0 so that if o¤ered the full-information contract, a type µ L agent would overstate his cost and mimic type µ H , as was the case throughout Section 3. Condition (C1) then is,
Following the same argument as in Proposition 1, for¸su¢ciently low, the optimal contract for type µ H agents is such that C1 0 binds. Then, conditional on Á H = 1, we have,
As in the linear case, whether randomization is optimal or not depends on the precise parameter values. To see this we continue the numerical example discussed above but where the restriction that q may not exceed q is relaxed -as we no longer have linear payo¤s it is not necessary to impose an upper bound on q.
Expression (6) 
1, which is concave in ¼ H . The optimal contract for µ H is Á H = 1, ¼ H = 0:78; and q H = 1:53, and when dealing with type µ H , the principal's expected pro…t is 0:23. Hence in this numerical example, forş u¢ciently low the optimal contract for µ H may again prescribe randomization, although in contrast with the linear case, the optimal q H is below its …rst-best value. positive is that, 
We therefore conclude that contract M is surely dominated.¥ Proof of Proposition 1: Consider …rst the solution of (P) ignoring (C1). It is straightforward to see the optimal M L prescribes Á L = ¼ L = 1, q L = q and this satis…es IC H . The FOCs for M H are,
Note that IC1 holds only if Á H = 1. Hence, the solution to the unconstrained problem satis…es IC1 only if
, which is never true under A3 and A4. 8 We therefore conclude that if the solution to the unconstrained problem satis…es IC1, then we must have ¼ H = Á H = 1, q H = q, and all the …rst order conditions above strictly positive so that,¸m
This establishes the …rst part of the proposition. Consider now the second part. When IC1 binds,
, and P 's expected payo¤ is, 
. Under A3 and A4,¸BH + (1 ¡¸)¢B >¸(CH ¡ BH) ¡ (1 ¡¸) (¢B ¡ ¢C) so the previous inequality cannot hold.
Two cases can arise. In the …rst 
> 0 and the lowest feasible ¼ H is q H = 0. However, from A3 and A4, Á H = 0 is preferred by P in this case. In the second case, 
Assumption A1 Does Not Hold
For completeness, we consider the case in which 0¸q¢µ + ¢B and so µ H types have incentives to understate their costs and mimic µ L types. The remaining assumptions A2 to A4 are assumed to still hold. The counterparts for the main results are as follows, Lemma 1B: It is never optimal for the principal to o¤er Á L = 1 in conjunction with ¼ L and q L satisfying,
An implication is that the participation constraint of type µ H will not bind at the optimum. The optimal contracts are now found by letting IC H hold with equality, setting let u L = 0, and ignoring
Proposition 2B: For type µ H , the optimal contract always prescribes
then ( C1B) is slack, and the optimal contract for type µ L has Á L = ¼ L = 1, q L = q. If (19) doesn't hold, then (C1B) binds, and the optimal contract for type µ L is, 
